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Abstract
The search for economically efficient policy instruments designed to promote the
diffusion of renewable energy technologies in liberalized markets has led to the in-
troduction of quota-based tradable ‘green’ certificate (TGC) schemes for renewable
electricity. However, there is a debate about the pros and cons of TGC, a quan-
tity control policy, compared to guaranteed feed-in tariffs, a price control policy. In
this paper we contrast these two alternatives in terms of social welfare, taking into
account that electricity markets are not perfectly competitive, and show that the
price control policy dominates the quantity control policy in terms of social welfare.
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Preprint submitted to Elsevier 31 May 2009
1 Introduction
Electricity generation from renewable energy sources is increasingly recognized
to play an important role for the achievement of a variety of primary and sec-
ondary energy policy goals, such as improved diversity and security of energy
supply, reduction of local pollutant and global greenhouse gas emissions, re-
gional and rural development, and exploitation of opportunities for fostering
social cohesion, value added and employment at the local and regional level.
The plan of the European Commission of the 1990s to issue an EU Directive
on the promotion of electricity from renewables (CEC, 1998, 1999a,b), which
eventually led to the issuance of Directive 2001/77/EC (CEC, 2001), has trig-
gered an intensive political and intellectual debate over the pros and cons
of guaranteed feed-in tariffs (FIT) versus tradable green certificate (TGC)
schemes (e.g. Rader, 2000; Berry, 2002; Lauber, 2004; Palmer and Burtraw,
2005; Madlener and Stagl, 2005; Kildegaard, 2008). 1 Recently, a new and more
comprehensive EU Draft Directive for renewable energy promotion has been
published (CEC, 2008a), in which no clear preference for one or another in-
strument is indicated. According to an accompanying Commission staff work-
ing document (CEC, 2008b), however, and given the track record of the two
instruments so far, the preference of the Commission seems to have shifted
away from establishing a uniform European TGC scheme in favor of creating
an investor-friendly climate and optimizing existing national systems. 2
∗ Corresponding author. E-mail: rmadlener@eonerc.rwth-aachen.de (R. Madlener);
Tel. +49-241-80 97 162; Fax: +49-241-80 92 206
1 In the literature quota-based TGC schemes are sometimes also referred to as
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS).
2 This apparent shift has to be seen in light of the very ambitious and binding
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Guaranteed FIT provide certainty about the achievable per-unit revenues from
selling renewable electricity to the grid. While FIT have turned out to be very
effective in countries such as Austria, Denmark, Germany and Spain, they
cause market distortions to increase when electricity generation from renew-
ables expands. In contrast, TGC are based on competitive market princi-
ples, typically featuring mandatory quota targets and certificate trading (e.g.
Menanteau et al., 2003). Since TGC promise to enhance static and dynamic
efficiency, they have attracted considerable attention. Over the years, they
have been introduced in a number of countries with liberalized electricity
markets (e.g. Berry and Jaccard, 2001; Dinica and Arentsen, 2003; Langniss
and Wiser, 2003; Lorenzoni, 2003; Nielsen and Jeppesen, 2003; Verbruggen,
2004; Fan et al., 2005; Nishio and Asano, 2006; Sa´enz de Miera et al., 2008).
More recently, the debate has been revolving around the interplay between
TGC markets and markets for tradable CO2 permits (e.g. Morthorst, 2001;
Jensen and Skytte, 2003; So¨derholm, 2008), and between TGC markets and
liberalized power markets (e.g. Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001, 2002; Jensen
and Skytte, 2002; Morthorst, 2003; Amundsen and Bergman, 2004), respec-
tively. Another active strand of research concerns financial risk of investors
(Lemming, 2003; Dinica, 2006).
While FIT is similar to a subsidy for suppliers of renewables, TGC constitute
policy target of achieving a 20% share of renewables in energy consumption by
2020. FIT, due to their relative simplicity in design, seem to find higher political
acceptance and have become widespread in Europe and elsewhere in recent years.
In CEC (2008a) it is reported that by 2007, of all 27 EU member countries, 18 had
a FIT (or premium/bonus) system in place, seven a quota-based TGC system, and
only two a tender system (Denmark for offshore wind, France for large projects).
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an internalization mechanism in the Baumol-Oates standard-price tradition
(Baumol and Oates, 1988). In fact, comparisons between taxes or subsidies
and quota-based certificate schemes have so far been undertaken mainly in
environmental economics, and in particular with regard to emission control.
Denicolo` (1999), for example, analyzes the effects of eﬄuent charges and pollu-
tion permits when innovation is expected. Building on seminal work by Weitz-
man (1974, 1978), Pizer (1999a,b) studies the difference between a tax and
quota policy under uncertainty, finding that uncertainty causes the optimal
amount of emission reduction to increase, which justifies a preference for taxa-
tion over quantity control. In the context of renewable energy, Madlener et al.
(2009) assess the impact of pre-commitment by government with respect to
policy targets in the presence of cost-reducing innovation. In an empirical
study, Palmer and Burtraw (2005) analyze the cost-effectiveness of two dif-
ferent renewable electricity policies (TGC vs. tax credits for renewable power
production) in the U.S., and their impact on greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper is devoted to the issue of whether the diffusion of renewable power
generating technologies can be better promoted by means of FIT or TGC, and
in particular whether one of the schemes dominates the other in terms of cost-
effectiveness and social welfare. We find that, given imperfectly competitive
electricity markets, social welfare achieved under the optimal FIT policy is
at least as high and likely to be strictly greater than social welfare under the
optimal TGC policy, the latter importantly depending on the outcome of a
strategic game in the market for tradable certificates. Our paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic models used for contrasting effects
of TGC and FIT in perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets for power.
Under perfect competition, the equivalence of TGC and FIT is shown. This
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equivalence does not hold in a duopoly with quasi-symmetric costs, as demon-
strated in section 3. Section 4 contains an evaluation of the two policies in
terms of social welfare. Section 5 discusses policy implications, and section 6
concludes.
2 Promoting renewable electricity in a competitive market
We start our analysis with the simplest case, assuming that in a perfectly
competitive electricity market there are N firms with equal electricity gener-
ation costs. Let there be only two options to produce electricity, either from
fossil/nuclear or renewable resources (solar, wind, hydro, biomass etc.), with
the second referred to as ‘green electricity’. We assume that generation costs of
fossil/nuclear power are generally lower than those of green electricity. How-
ever, green electricity cannot only help to avoid negative externalities from
fossil/nuclear power generation, but also yield positive externalities in the
form of different kinds of socio-economic benefits (e.g. creation of new employ-
ment, local value-added and infrastructure, spillovers from R&D in innovative
energy technologies and systems). 3 The fact that these externalities are not
sufficiently taken into account in decisions regarding the type and level of elec-
tricity production and consumption may motivate policy interventions such
as the introduction of FIT and TGC.
3 Note that the use of green electricity may also lead to non-negligible negative
externalities (e.g. Abbasi and Abbasi, 2000; Tsoutsos et al., 2005), but we assume
here that these are generally smaller than the positive ones.
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2.1 FIT as a subsidy policy
The term ‘subsidy’ here refers to a transfer paid by the government or elec-
tricity consumers to the suppliers of green electricity. Thus, producers receive
a surcharge s per unit of green electricity. 4 Given a competitive market, a
representative generator of power faces the following optimization problem,
max
xb,xg
[pxb + (p+ s)xg − Cb(xb)− Cg(xg)] , (1)
where xb and xg denote the amounts of electricity produced from fossil/nuclear
(‘brown’) fuels and renewable (‘green’) energy sources, respectively, Cb(xb) is
the cost function for electricity produced from fossil/nuclear fuel, Cg(xg) is
the cost function for green electricity, and p denotes the average market price
for electricity. For an interior solution, the f.o.c. are
p−C ′b[x∗b] = 0 (2)
p+s− C ′g[x∗g] = 0. (3)
Inserting (2) into (3), we find that in an optimum with xb > 0 and xg > 0,
the government subsidy s (or negative tax) has to be equal to the (absolute)
difference between the marginal costs of green and conventional electricity
evaluated at the optimum, C ′g[x
∗
g] and C
′
b[x
∗
b], with C
′
g[x
∗
g] > C
′
b[x
∗
b]. The eco-
nomic intuition behind this result is that if s > C ′g[x
∗
g]−C ′b[x∗b], all generators
will supply green electricity only; in contrast, if s < C ′g[x
∗
g]− C ′b[x∗b], then no
green electricity at all will be provided.
4 In reality it is usually the power fed into the grid that counts, which due to on-site
electricity consumption and transmission losses may be considerably less than gross
production. This difference is neglected here for simplicity.
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2.2 TGC as a quota-based policy
Rather than subsidizing green electricity, the government can also impose a
green power production quota on each generator. 5 If a generator falls short
of the quota, it faces a fine that increases with the shortfall. For each unit of
green electricity produced, the generator obtains a certificate, providing proof
of partial satisfaction of the norm.
Initially, assume that certificates are non-tradable. This assumption is natural
given the assumption of identical costs across generators (no opportunity for
trading). In section 3 below, the non-tradability assumption will be relaxed
and a market for certificates introduced. For the situation of non-tradable
certificates, the objective function that applies to a generator can be stated
as:
max
xb,xg
[p · (xb + xg)− f · (x¯g − xg)− Cb(xb)− Cg(xg)] , (4)
where x¯g denotes the green electricity quota of the firm, f is the fine per unit
of shortfall from the norm, and p, xb, xg, Cb(xb), Cg(xg) are the same as
before. The f.o.c. with respect to xg read
p−C ′b[x∗b] = 0 (5)
p+f − C ′g[x∗g] = 0. (6)
Note the similarity of (6) and (3). In fact the fine f plays the same role as
the subsidy s, which therefore represents the shadow price of the quota. In an
optimum, the unit price of the certificate should be equal to (slightly lower
than) the value of the fine per unit.
5 Note that in practice it is often the wholesalers or retailers, and sometimes even
the final consumers of electricity, that are obliged to fulfil the quota.
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2.3 Equivalence of FIT and TGC given identical costs
To show the equivalence of FIT and TGC, i.e. subsidy and quota-based poli-
cies, in terms of social welfare, we state the problem of a social planner as
follows: 6
W (Q, xg) = max
Q,xg
∫ Q
0
p(ν)dν −N · Cb
(
Q
N
− xg
)
−N · Cg(xg) + E(Nxg),
(7)
where Q = N(xb+xg) stands for total electricity output produced by N firms,
p(ν) for the inverse demand function, and E(Nxg) for the monetary value of
the avoided negative and achieved positive externalities associated with green
electricity production. As f.o.c. one obtains
p[Q∗]− C ′b[x∗b] = 0 (8)
C ′b[x
∗
b] = C
′
g[x
∗
g]− E ′[Nx∗g], (9)
which determine the social optimum values of Q∗, x∗b and x
∗
g. Eq. (9) simply
says that optimal aggregate output of green electricity must be such that
the difference between the marginal cost and the marginal external benefit
of green electricity is equal to the marginal cost of conventional power. If
these quantities are known, the quota can be set as x¯g = x
∗
g. The optimal
subsidy level is given by s∗ = C ′g[x
∗
g] − C ′b[x∗b] from (3), and the optimal fine
by f ∗ = C ′g[x
∗
g]− p from (6).
Obviously, subsidy and quota levels that are set according to the optimal
values determined by maximizing social welfare will lead to the same level
6 Seminal work on the equivalence of price and quantity control was provided by
Bhagwati (1969) in the context of foreign trade (tariffs vs. quotas) and by Weitzman
(1974) in the context of pollutant emission control (taxes vs. quotas), respectively.
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Fig. 1. Equivalence of subsidy and quota-based policy given equal costs.
of green electricity production, yielding the same welfare. In this sense, and
given our assumptions, the subsidy system and quota system are equivalent.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic intuition behind these results. Let S∗ denote
the supply schedule reflecting that green power creates an external benefit
to society. Therefore, it should be used at a rate x1g > x
0
g, with x
0
g being the
outcome of supply S0 based on private (marginal) cost and demandD. Clearly,
the efficient quantity of green power can be attained by paying the optimal
subsidy s∗, or imposing the optimal quota x¯∗g.
3 Duopoly market and quasi-symmetric costs
Studying the case of imperfectly competitive power markets as a duopoly game
under quasi-symmetric costs can be justified on the following grounds. First,
power markets are dominated by a few major players. For example, EdF still
9
has a monopoly in France, PowerGen (now E.ON) has a market share of about
22 percent in the UK, and the four biggest suppliers in Germany, RWE, E.ON
Energie, Vattenfall Europe and EnBW, together control more than two thirds
of the market (cf. Bower et al., 2001; Matthes et al., 2005). Second, assuming
the production costs of green power to be the same for all producers is not
compatible with certificate trading. Therefore, we extend the basic model to
the case of heterogeneous production costs in order to derive the potential for
trade of green certificates.
Assume there are two generators in the market, firm 1 and 2, that have iden-
tical technology and hence cost functions in using fossil/nuclear fuel but dif-
ferent costs of generating renewable electricity. In this sense, the firms are
‘quasi-symmetric’. The main reason to expect heterogeneous cost structures
for green power is that it does not constitute yet a mature technology like
that based on fossil or nuclear fuels, where competition presumably has forced
operators to adopt the least-cost alternative. Therefore, producers of green
power are assumed to employ different technologies, have more or less favor-
able siting of plants, use energy resources of different qualities, and employ
different vintage mixes of a given technology.
To keep our model simple and to avoid multiple equilibria, we assume the
cost function in using fossil/nuclear fuel Cb(xb) = cbxb to be linear and the
difference of marginal cost between firm 1 and firm 2, C ′1g(y)−C ′2g(y), to be a
positive constant. Without loss of generality, we assume C1g(y) > C2g(y) for
any y > 0. With some loss of generality, but considerable gain in simplicity,
let the demand function take on the following form,
p(x1b, x1g, x2b, x2g) = a− x1b − x1g − x2b − x2g, a > 0, (10)
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which implies that consumers’ willingness to pay is the same for fossil/nuclear
and green power.
We start with the subsidy policy, focussing on the Cournot solution because
power markets have been characterized by an absence of the fierce price com-
petition one would expect in a Bertrand world. Limited price competition may
be the result of collusion (Newbery, 2002), a variant of which is to stick to
Cournot strategies. Moreover, under certain circumstances (e.g., capacity con-
straints), Cournot strategies continue to be pursued even under Bertrand-type
competition (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). In such a market set-up, firm 1
(the leader) believes that firm 2 (the follower) will react to firm 1’s choice of
green power produced. Thus in equilibrium firm 1 will have chosen a higher
production level than in the case of a Cournot equilibrium and, consequently,
firm 2 a lower level. 7
3.1 Effect of subsidy on equilibrium
In this section, we assume that the subsidy is uniform, failing to take the
difference in cost into account; the case of a non-uniform subsidy is discussed
in section 3.2 below. Here, the two firms face the following decision problem,
max
xib,xig
(a− xib − xig − xjb − xjg)(xib + xig) + sxig − cbxib − Cig(xig), (11)
where i, j = 1, 2, and i 6= j.
We assume that the subsidy s is exogenous to and equal across firms. Gener-
alizing condition (3), one can distinguish three different cases for the subsidy
7 A Stackelberg variant of this model would be an interesting extension, which is
beyond the scope of this paper, however.
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level (denoted S1–S3).
3.1.1 Case S1: s ≤ C ′2g[x∗2g]− cb < C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb
If s < C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb, it is obvious that no green electricity will be produced
because the subsidy does not make up for the efficient producer’s cost disad-
vantage. Accordingly, the standard Cournot solution to the game is (cf. Kreps,
1990, p. 326),
x∗1b = x
∗
2b =
a− cb
3
; x∗1g = x
∗
2g = 0. (12)
If s = C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb, then generator 2 is indifferent between producing green
electricity and fossil/nuclear electricity.
3.1.2 Case S2: C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb ≤ s < C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb
In this case, the subsidy makes up for the cost disadvantage of green power
for generator 2, but fails to do so for the less efficient generator 1, who there-
fore refrains from producing green electricity. The Cournot solution remains
the same (in the sense that total electricity output of each firm remains un-
changed), as compared to the case of a uniform quota.
So if s > C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb, then generator 2 switches to green electricity, i.e.,
x∗1b=
a− 2cb + C ′2g[x∗2g]− s
3
(13)
x∗2g=
a− 2C ′2g[x∗2g] + cb + 2s
3
(14)
x∗1g= x
∗
2b = 0. (15)
Note that x∗1b in (13) and x
∗
2g in (14) are larger than in (12).
12
3.1.3 Case S3: s ≥ C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb
If s > C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb, then the subsidy overcompensates the cost disadvantage
of green power even for the less efficient generator 1. Therefore, both firms
produce green electricity only. Accordingly, the optimal solutions are now
x∗1g =
a+ C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− 2C ′1g[x∗1g] + s
3
(16)
x∗2g =
a+ C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− 2C ′2g[x∗2g] + s
3
(17)
x∗1b= x
∗
2b = 0. (18)
In the limiting case where s = C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb, generator 1 is indifferent between
producing green and fossil/nuclear power, while generator 2, being efficient in
the production of green power, supplies green electricity only.
3.1.4 Optimal subsidy level
The results derived in the previous subsection show that the equilibrium so-
lutions to the Cournot game strongly depend upon the level of the subsidy.
This raises the issue of determining the optimal subsidy level. In analogy to
(7), let social welfare be given by
W j(Q, x1g, x2g; s)=
∫ Q
0
p(ν)dν − cb(Q− x1g − x1g)
−C1g(x1g)− C2g(x2g) + E(xg), (19)
with W j denoting the social welfare gains associated with case j (j = 1, 2,
and 3) of sections 3.1.1–3.1.3. We assume that in case 2, s is slightly greater
than C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb, and in case 3 slightly greater than C ′1g[x∗1g] − cb, in order
to avoid ambiguity.
To facilitate comparison between the cases, the externality function associated
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with green electricity takes the form E(xg) = βxg, β > 0. While it would
certainly be interesting to elaborate on possible alternative functional forms
of E(xg), and consequences for the outcome, such an analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper and saved for future research.
The parameter β (called ‘welfare parameter’ henceforth) implies a constant
marginal social benefit from producing green electricity. Using the equilibrium
values given in (11) to (17), the welfare associated with the three cases can be
written as follows:
W 1=
(
a− Q
2
)
Q− cbQ (20)
W 2=
(
a− Q
2
)
Q+ βx2g − cb(Q− x2g)− C2g(x2g) (21)
W 3=
(
a− Q
2
)
Q+ βQ− C1g(x1g)− C2g(x2g). (22)
As is to be expected, whether or not the welfare parameter β exceeds the
marginal cost parameters is of crucial importance. For β > C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb, the
welfare parameter is larger than the additional costs incurred by firm 1, so
that it is optimal if both firms produce green electricity. Conversely, if the
positive externality βx2b exceeds the extra costs of producing green electricity
for firm 2, it is optimal if firm 2 produces green instead of brown electricity.
More specifically, we can distinguish the following situations:
(A) if β > C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb, then W 3 > W 2 > W 1. Hence the optimal subsidy is
the lower bound of the subsidy interval in case 3, i.e., s∗A = C
′
1g[x
∗
1g]− cb.
(B) if β = C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb, then W 3 = W 2 > W 1. The welfare gains remain the
same for s∗B = C
′
1g[x
∗
1g] − cb and s∗∗B = C ′2g[x∗2g] − cb, though the amounts of
green electricity produced are different.
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C´1g  [x1g*]– cb
Optimal
values of s
C´2g [x2g*]– cb
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D
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A
Fig. 2. Optimal subsidy levels vs welfare parameter β of green electricity, cases A
through D.
(C) if C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb ≤ β < C ′1g[x∗1g] − cb, then W 2 > W 3 and W 2 ≥ W 1. The
optimal subsidy is thus equal to the lower bound of the subsidy interval in
case 2, i.e., s∗C = C
′
2g[x
∗
2g]− cb.
(D) if β < C ′2g[x
∗
2g]−cb, thenW 1 > W 2 > W 3. Therefore, the optimal subsidy
is zero, because none of the rates are effective in promoting green power.
Figure 2 summarizes the optimal subsidy schedule for different values of the
welfare parameter β.
3.2 Quota-based policy
Building on (4) of section 2.2, the decision problem faced by the two firms in
a duopoly market can be written as
15
max
xib,xig
[(a− xib − xig − xjb − xjg)(xib + xig) + z(x˜ig − x˜jg)
− f(x¯g − xig − x˜ig)− cbxib − Cig(xig)],
s.t. xig + xjg = 2x¯,
(23)
with x˜ig (x˜jg) denoting the amount of certificates sold (purchased), respec-
tively, i, j = 1 or 2, and i 6= j, f denoting the fine per unit as in (4), and z
denoting the certificate price. Note that the constraint implies that the amount
of green certificates produced by the two firms must not exceed the industry
quota – i.e. we assume that once the quota is satisfied the certificate price
drops to zero. Thus, there is no incentive to produce more green electricity
than is required by the quota target.
In the above model, each firm has two choice variables. However, given the
assumption that the difference C ′1g(y) − C ′2g(y) is a positive constant for any
y > 0, generator 1’s choice of x1g boils down to a choice between 0 and x¯g,
depending on the ordering of f , z, and the level of the difference in marginal
costs of producing green and brown electricity (cf. figure 3). If it is in the
interest of generator 1 to purchase green electricity certificates at all, it must
also be (at least weakly) in its interest to go all the way. Therefore, we can
find a Nash equilibrium by comparing the firms’ payoffs for x∗1g ∈ {0, x¯g},
which will be shown in the following section. Before turning to the Nash
equilibrium, however, we briefly discuss the different possible cases, of which
we will examine the two that are desirable from a social welfare point of view.
First, the fine could fall short of the difference in marginal costs for firms 1
and 2, in which both firms prefer to pay the fine and produce conventional
electricity only.
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Second, if the fine is larger than the cost difference for firm 2 but lower than
the marginal cost difference for firm 1 of producing green instead of brown
electricity, then we can distinguish two sub-cases: either the certificate price
is larger or smaller than the fine. In the former case, firm 1 prefers to pay
the fine, rather than buying certificates from firm 2, while in the latter case it
would buy certificates from firm 2 up to its quota (provided, of course, that
trading is possible).
Third, the fine is set at a higher level than the difference in the marginal costs
of producing green instead of conventional electricity for both generators. In
this case we can again distinguish two sub-cases, one where z is lower than
the cost difference for firm 1 (so that it has an incentive to buy certificates
up to x¯ from generator 2) and a situation where it is higher (in which case
generator 1 would self-generate green electricity up to its quota 8 ).
In the following, we consider the two cases where certificate trading occurs
(case I) and the case where firm 1 self-produces green certificates (case II).
3.3 Nash equilibrium under the quota-based policy
We now elaborate the Nash equilibrium for the quota-based policy, by com-
paring the firms’ payoffs under the two socially desirable strategies stated at
the end of the previous section 3.2. Hence, in the discussion that follows, we
distinguish the two cases I and II.
8 Note that in this situation generator 1 would possibly be forced at some point to
leave the market, as its costs of producing green electricity are too high.
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Fig. 3. Effects of the TGC policy in a duopoly game
3.3.1 Case I: x∗1g = 0
Case I refers to a situation where the cost difference for firm 1 of producing
green instead of brown electricity is lower than the fine f but higher than the
certificate price z. Therefore, it is cheaper for firm 1 to buy certificates from
firm 2. Given that x∗1g = 0, generator 2 is required to produce at least 2x¯g
units of green electricity in order to satisfy the industry quota. This can be
summarized as follows,
x∗1g = 0⇔ f > C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb > z > C ′2g[x∗2g]− cb (24)
or as
C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb > f > z > C ′2g[x∗2g]− cb.
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Firm 1 solves the problem
max
x1b,x1g
Π1 = (a−x1b−x2b−x2g)x1b− cbx1b− zx˜g−max{0, f(x¯g− x˜1g)}, (25)
with f.o.c.:
∂Π1
∂x1b
= a− 2x∗1b − x∗2b − x∗2g − cb = 0. (26)
Observing the constraint x2g ≥ 2x¯g, firm 2 solves
max
x2b,x2g
L(x2b, x2g, λ)= (a− x1b − x2b − x2g)(x2b + x2g)− cbx2b + zx˜g
−max{0, f(x¯g − x2g + x˜g)} − C2g(x2g) + λ(2x¯g − x2g),
with λ ≥ 0 denoting the Lagrange multiplier. The f.o.c. read,
∂L
∂x2b
= a− x∗1b − 2x∗2b − 2x∗2g − cb = 0 (27)
∂L
∂x2g
= a− x∗1b − 2x∗2b − 2x∗2g − cb − C ′2g(x∗2g) + f + λ = 0. (28)
From (26) and (27) we get x∗1b = (a− cb)/3, and from (27) and (28) we obtain
x∗2b + x
∗
2g = (a− cb)/3.
Given that firm 1 does not produce any green electricity, we need to distinguish
two subcases. In the first subcase (Ia, Appendix A), firm 2 self-generates its
own quota, while in the second subcase (Ib, Appendix A) it produces twice
the individual firm’s quota (and hence is able to sell the excess certificates to
firm 1, which faces higher production costs).
Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) say that the two firms will produce the same total quan-
tity of electricity, determined by the maximum possible market demand and
the cost of producing electricity from fossil/nuclear fuel. From (27) and (28)
we obtain
λ = C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb − f. (29)
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Eq. (29) indicates that if C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb > f , such that λ > 0, generator 2
will only produce green electricity up to the industry quota as required by
our assumptions, due to the Kuhn–Tucker condition. Note that trading of
certificates is also possible as long as C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb ≥ f . However, if C ′2g[x∗2g]−
cb = f (and hence λ = 0), generator 2 has an incentive to produce at least
the quota required from the industry. Also note that different values of f ∈
[C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb, C ′1g[x∗1g] − cb] only affect the distribution of profits between
the two firms, with no impact on the amount of certificate trading and social
welfare. Therefore, we first focus on the case C ′2g[x
∗
2g]−cb = f as a benchmark.
The optimal quota continues to be determined as in eqs. (7)–(9), except that
C ′b[x
∗
b] = cb. Hence x¯g = x
∗
g/2 still holds. As long as 2x¯g ≤ (a − cb)/3 [see
eq. (A.2)], generator 2 produces (a − cb)/3 − 2x¯g units of electricity using
fossil/nuclear fuel and 2x¯g units of green electricity. As to 2x¯g > (a − cb)/3,
recall that a denotes the willingness to pay for the first kWh of electricity,
while cb symbolizes the (constant) marginal cost of fossil/nuclear power, which
makes a− cb a very large number. It is unlikely for x¯g to exceed one sixth of
that number, justifying that this case is neglected.
So far, we have assumed that generator 1 is the only buyer of generator 2’s
extra certificates. However, there may be another agent willing to purchase
the certificates at the market price, for example, an environmental protection
agency or a foundation promoting renewable energy. Since the equilibrium
price of certificates is determined in such a manner that generator 2 is indif-
ferent between producing green or fossil/nuclear fuel electricity, the presence
of an additional bidder might cause generator 2 to produce green electricity
in excess of the quota. However, this would make the system a combination of
quantity and price policies. The reason is that these extra purchases, resulting
20
in an increase of the value of the certificates, can be viewed as a subsidy. It
is possible that such a policy mix is more effective in promoting green power
than either one of the two policy instruments individually. However, a detailed
analysis of such a mixed policy is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3.2 Case II: x∗1g = x¯g
We now turn to the case of generator 1 producing green electricity to satisfy
the quota. This is possible if the difference in the marginal cost of producing
green and brown electricity is strictly lower than the certificate price (and the
fine), or formally,
x∗1g = x¯g ⇔ f > z > C ′1g[x1g]− cb. (30)
With no external agent purchasing, the condition x1g = x¯g or x2g = x¯g con-
tinues to hold. Firm 1’s optimization problem now reads,
max
x1b,x1g
Π1 = (a− x1b − x2b − x¯g − x2g)(x1b + x¯g)− cbx1b − C1g(x¯g),
with f.o.c.,
∂Π1
∂x1b
= a− 2x∗1b − 2x¯g − x∗2b − x2g − cb = 0; (31)
while firm 2 solves the problem
max
x2b,x2g
Π2=(a− x1b − x2b − x¯g − x2g)(x2b + x2g)− cbx2b − C2g(x2g) (32)
−max{0, f(x¯g − x2g)}.
Since x∗2g can only take on x¯g or 2x¯g as optimal values, we concentrate on
x∗2g ≥ x¯g and only consider the first-order condition concerning variable x2b,
which reads:
∂Π2
∂x2b
= a− 2x∗2b − 2x2g − x∗1b − x¯g − cb = 0. (33)
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From (31) and (33) we get x∗1b = (a− c)/3− x¯g and x∗2b = (a− c)/3− x2g.
As before, we have to distinguish two subcases (IIa and IIb in Appendix A), in
both of which firm 1 self-generates green electricity up to its individual quota,
while firm 2 either produces x¯g or twice x¯g.
Firm 1
Firm 2
x¯g 2x¯g
0 −fx¯g, −cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g) −zx¯g, (z − 2cb)x¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
x¯g cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g), cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g) cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g), 2cbx¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
Fig. 4. Payoffs to producers of green electricity under the TGC policy
If firm 2’s strategy is to produce the minimal quota, then firm 1’s best response
is x1g = x¯g if C1g(x¯g)− cbx¯g ≤ fx¯g. However, if firm 2’s strategy is to produce
twice the quota, then firm 1’s best response is x1g = 0 if C1g(x¯g)− cbx¯g ≥ zx¯g.
If firm 1’s strategy is to produce 0, then firm 2’s best response is 2x¯g, provided
the following condition holds: C2g(2x¯g)−C2g(x¯g) ≤ (z− cb)x¯g. This condition
holds due to the assumptions made in this paper. If firm 1’s strategy is to
produce the minimal quota, then firm 2’s best response is x¯g, provided that
the following condition is satisfied: C2g(2x¯g)−C2g(x¯g) ≥ cbx¯g. This condition
again holds due to the assumptions made. Therefore, if the condition zx¯g ≤
C1g(x¯g) − cbx¯g ≤ fx¯g is satisfied, this game has two Nash equilibria in pure
strategies: (0, 2x¯g) and (x¯g, x¯g).
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4 Welfare comparison between subsidy and quota-based policies
In spite of the simplifying assumptions made, a welfare comparison between
a price-subsidy and a quota policy may be worthwhile because it promises to
provide some guidance to policy-makers regarding the choice of instruments
for promoting renewable energy use.
4.1 Welfare gains under the subsidy policy
Since our main interest is to discuss how to efficiently promote green power,
case S1 (section 3.1.1) can be disregarded since it is fossil/nuclear only. In
addition, case S3 (section 3.1.3) is not realistic because it predicts that all
firms exclusively produce green power, which would presuppose extremely
high green electricity quota. Therefore, we only examine the case associated
with condition C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb ≤ β < C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb, i.e. case S2 of section 3.1.2.
The pertinent welfare function is repeated from (21) for convenience,
W s =
(
a− Q
2
)
Q− cb(Q− x2g)− C2g(x2g) + βx2g, (34)
where Q continues to be total production of both types of electricity. Remem-
ber that in case S2 we have x∗1g = x
∗
2b = 0 and the optimal subsidy is given by
s∗C = C
′
2g[x
∗
2g]−cb, thus the total production given the optimal subsidy scheme
can be determined as Qs = xs1b + x
s
2g = 2(a − cb)/3, with xs2g = (a − cb)/3
denoting the amount of green energy produced by firm 2. Therefore, social
welfare achieved by the optimal subsidy scheme is
W s = (Qs)2 − C2g
(
Qs
2
)
+ (cb + β)
Qs
2
. (35)
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4.2 Welfare gains under the quota-based policy
If marginal costs of green power are increasing, the optimal quota cannot
be determined directly. To match the production of green electricity in the
subsidy case, we simply assume that x¯g is equal to (a − cb)/6, which may
constitute a rather frequent solution [see the discussion after eq. (29) in sec-
tion 3.3.1]. The welfare function for the quota-based certificate system can
then be specified as
W q =
(
a− Q
2
)
Q− cb(Q− x2g)− C2g(x2g) + βx2g. (36)
The total amount of energy Qq = 2(a− cb)/3 produced given the quota-based
policy is identical with Qs. However, w.r.t. to x2g, we have to distinguish the
following two possible pure Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game described
in section 3.3.2:
(i) Welfare achieved in the Nash equilibrium (xq11g, x
q1
2g) = (0, 2x¯g),
W q1 = (Qq)2 − C2g
(
Qq
2
)
+ (cb + β)
Qq
2
. (37)
Since Qq = Qs, the welfare under the quota-based policy realized in this
Nash equilibrium is equal to the welfare under the optimal subsidy policy.
(ii) Welfare achieved in the Nash equilibrium (xq21g, x
q2
2g) = (x¯g, x¯g),
W q2 = (Qq)2 − C2g
(
Qq
4
)
+ (cb + β)
Qq
4
. (38)
Note that the welfare level W q2 is lower than W q1 = W s if
C2g(2x¯g)− C2g(x¯g) < (cb + β)x¯g.
This condition is satisfied if the level of marginal social benefit of green elec-
tricity β is sufficiently high. Hence, the subsidy policy guarantees a welfare
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level which might not be achieved with the quota policy if the Nash equilib-
rium (x¯g, x¯g) is played. A comparison of both firms’ profits as well as of their
sum shows that only firm 1 is better off in the socially efficient equilibrium
(0, 2x¯g). Under our assumptions, both firm 2’s profit and total producer sur-
plus are likely to be higher in the socially less desirable equilibrium (x¯g, x¯g).
Therefore, even if the Cournot game were repeated an infinite number of times,
no cooperative equilibrium would occur with both firms choosing the socially
desirable strategies.
4.3 Welfare of subsidy and quota-based policies in a quasi-symmetric duopoly
Comparing welfare levels given in (35), (37), and (38), one sees that, for suffi-
ciently high marginal social benefits of green energy, W s = W q1 > W q2. This
result implies that even with imperfect competition and quasi-heterogeneous
costs, subsidies should be preferred to tradable certificates. This is intuitive,
since outcomes in a duopoly crucially depend on whether firms pursue price- or
quantity-oriented strategies and FIT could be said to be price-oriented whereas
TGC is quantity-oriented. However, the results established above given imper-
fectly competitive markets seem to hinge on two crucial assumptions. The first
is that TGC are tradable. This means that price is the signal to competitors,
precisely as the subsidy under FIT. And since the quota and the subsidy
are set as to optimally internalize the externalities present, the information
content of price is the same under both regimes. Second, competitors pursue
optimal duopoly strategies regardless of the choice of internalization policy
adopted by the government.
In addition to these two basic premises, there are simplifying assumptions that
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should be kept in mind. Specifically, the cost of administering subsidies and/or
quota are neglected and therefore assumed equal. However, when it comes to
start-up costs, a certificate system may require more resources than a subsidy
system, especially for establishing appropriate regulation and regulatory con-
trol. Also, information regarding cost and marginal revenues on the part of
competitors as well as marginal positive externalities of green power on the
part of government was assumed perfect. Yet due to cost heterogeneity, the
amount of information required for calculating the optimal subsidy typically
increases with a growing number of firms. Although the setting of the optimal
quota requires similar information, the heterogeneity of firms does not en-
ter their determination, causing it to be relatively straightforward and hence
probably less costly than a subsidy system. These considerations also suggest
that a generalization from duopoly to oligopoly would be straightforward.
Further, we found that subsidies provide more incentives for green power pre-
cisely when its marginal social benefits are high (as in case S3 of section 3.1.3).
A pure quota-based TGC system lacks this feature.
5 Policy implications
Based on several models incorporating imperfect competitiveness of markets
for power for added realism, we find that the subsidy (FIT) approach, when
implemented at its socially optimal value, leads to a welfare gain, which is
not necessarily achieved with the quota-based (TGC) policy. Furthermore,
the subsidy policy is generally preferred by utilities, likely because it does
not call into question their right to cause a certain amount of pollution when
using fossil/nuclear fuel input. At the same time, subsidies do provide stronger
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incentives for pollution-abating innovation than quotas by directly favoring
production of green electricity. Since the future of green electricity importantly
depends on future technological progress for lowering its cost of production,
subsidies are also more efficient dynamically.
On the other hand, the financing of subsidies requires tax revenue. When the
(economic or political) cost of additional taxation is high, like in the United
States (but also in Scandinavian countries e.g.), the quota-based approach
may provide a viable alternative. As found in the present analysis, tradable
green certificates are more efficient than non-tradable ones regardless of market
structure. Trade in certificates is likely to develop because green power does
not yet rely on a mature cost-minimizing technology, contrary to fossil/nuclear
generation. Moreover, since the cost of running a market for certificates is
lower once the market is established, the disadvantage of the quota-based
policy will gradually wane, without however reaching the dynamic efficiency
of the subsidy approach.
6 Conclusions
This paper starts from the suspicion that the conventional wisdom, claim-
ing a tax/subsidy (FIT) and a quota/certificate (TGC) policy scheme to be
equivalent in terms of static efficiency, might not hold if markets for power
are imperfectly competitive. Based on a duopoly model in which the two com-
petitors differ in terms of their marginal cost of producing ‘green’ power, we
show that, if both schemes are implemented at their respective socially opti-
mal values, the subsidy policy is at least equivalent, but can be superior to
the quota policy depending on the outcome of the game in the market for
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green certificates. The subsidy and the tradable certificate contain the same
(correct) price information entering competitors’ strategy choices, which are
of the Cournot type regardless of the scheme considered. Interestingly, how-
ever, only one of two pure-strategy Nash equilibria under the quota-based
policy corresponds to the unique equilibrium outcome under the subsidy pol-
icy whereas the other Nash equilibrium (in which both firms produce green
energy) leads to a lower welfare level. In view of the technological heterogene-
ity of green power generation, it is important that certificates are tradable.
Also, the possible equivalence breaks down as soon as incentives for pollution-
abating innovation are considered as well. Thus, the subsidy is the preferable
approach; on the other hand, its financing may meet with a high marginal
cost of taxation.
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A Appendix
Subcase Ia: x∗1b =
a− cb
3
; x∗1g = 0; x∗2b =
a− cb
3
− x¯g; x∗2g = x¯g
Market demand:
a− x1b − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb3 (A.1)
Firms’ profits:
Π1=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb · a− cb3 − fx¯g =
(a− cb)2
9
− fx¯g;
Π2=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb ·
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
+ zx¯g − C2g(x¯g)− fx¯g
=
(a− cb)2
9
− cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g)
Subcase Ib: x∗1b =
a− cb
3
; x∗1g = 0; x∗2b =
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g; x∗2g = 2x¯g
Market demand:
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a− x1b − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb3 (A.2)
Firms’ profits:
Π1=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cba− cb3 − zx¯g =
(a− cb)2
9
− zx¯g;
Π2=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g
)
+ zx¯g − C2g(2x¯g)− fx¯g
=
(a− cb)2
9
+ (z − 2cb)x¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
Subcase IIa (symmetry): x∗1b = x
∗
2b =
a− cb
3
− x¯g; x∗1g = x∗2g = x¯g
Market demand:
a− x1b − x1g − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb3 (A.3)
Firms’ profits:
Π1=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
− C1g(x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g);
Π2=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
− C2g(x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g)
Subcase IIb: x∗1b =
a− cb
3
− x¯g; x∗1g = x¯g; x∗2b =
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g; x∗2g = 2x¯g
Market demand:
a− x1b − x1g − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb3 (A.4)
Firms’ profits:
Π1=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
− C1g(x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g);
Π2=
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g
)
− C2g(2x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ 2cbx¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
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